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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
DOWD, District Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The appellants, Richard Pitt and William Strube, stand 
convicted of the primary charge of engaging in a 1994 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 486 
kilograms of cocaine. Richard Pitt was, at the time of the 
conspiracy, a documented confidential informant for the 
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United States Customs Service. Pitt and Strube defended 
their conduct with respect to the 486 kilograms of cocaine 
as a necessary predicate to obtaining, in a reverse sting 
operation, an enormous quantity of cocaine from the Cali 
Cartel in Colombia. In preparation, Pitt and Strube 
purchased the Ridgely Warfield, a sea-going vessel which 
was to be used to transport the Cali cocaine. Thus the 
primary defense advanced by Pitt and Strube was that of 
public authority, recognized by Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.3. The 
district court's denial of a jury instruction based on the 
defense of public authority is the primary error advanced in 
the appeals of Pitt and Strube. We affirm the convictions 
and sentences. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Richard Pitt, a pilot and a smuggler by trade, enlisted as 
a documented confidential informant with the U.S. 
Customs Service in 1992 after his release from a Mexican 
prison based on a sentence arising from flying a load of 
cocaine into Mexico from Colombia. In 1993, Pitt brokered 
a deal between an undercover Customs agent and a group 
of Mexicans to buy $1.3 million worth of cocaine. The 
reverse sting was successful and $1.3 million was seized, 
with Pitt receiving $350,000 for his efforts. 
 
While still working with U.S. Customs Special Agents 
Roger Bower and Chuck Mohle, Pitt conceived a plan to 
entice the Cali Cartel to hire him to transport a large 
quantity of cocaine by an ocean-going vessel. Pitt enlisted 
Strube in that plan and they acquired the Ridgely Warfield 
for that avowed purpose. Agents Bower and Mohle were 
advised on the Pitt-Strube plan. However, Pitt and Strube 
did not advise the Customs agents that, in the summer of 
1994, they were receiving and transporting large shipments 
of cocaine from Los Angeles to New York. The first shipment 
of 150 kilograms took place in mid-July; the second 
shipment of 150 kilograms took place in early August of 
1994. A California State police officer intercepted the third 
shipment of 186 kilograms destined for New York in a 
vehicle driven by Pitt. Information about the third shipment 
was obtained by an on-going Title III interception; however, 
the stop of vehicle was made for the ostensible reason of a 
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traffic violation so as avoid any revelation about the Title III 
operation. The traffic stop led to the seizure of the 186 
kilograms in the third shipment. 
 
During the government's case in chief, persuasive 
 960<!>testimony was produced which demonstrated the 
 
culpability of Pitt and Strube relating to the first two 
shipments of cocaine to New York, including the testimony 
of Pitt's relatives who had been involved in the operation. 
The recipient of the cocaine in New York, Gloria Ramirez, 
also testified and accounted for the large sums of cash that 
were subsequently delivered to Pitt and Strube in payment 
for the earlier shipments. 
 
The government produced Customs Agents Bower and 
Mohle who offered extensive testimony about their 
relationship with Pitt as the documented confidential 
informant for Customs. They conceded that Pitt had 
outlined his plan to persuade the Cali Cartel to use the sea- 
going vessel Ridgely Warfield, to transport cocaine to the 
United States for seizure. However, they denied any 
advance information about the Pitt-Strube plan to ship the 
468 kilograms of cocaine to New York from Los Angeles. 
They also insisted that Pitt had been advised by his 
separate contacts that he was not authorized to engage in 
criminal conduct as a part of his plan. Pitt also testified at 
length about his contact with Bower and Mohle and 
suggested that they had agreed inferentially with criminal 
conduct to bring about the anticipated large shipment of 
cocaine by use of sea-going vessel. 
 
In ruling on the Pitt motion for a new trial, the district 
court summarized his testimony as follows: 
 
       . . . Defendant himself admitted that no one had told 
       him he could sell cocaine for profit. (Trial Transcript 
       ("Tr.") at 1218.) He also acknowledged that he knew it 
       was against U.S. Customs' policy to let drugs "walk" 
       and, therefore, could not get official approval for his 
       operation. (Tr. at 869.) In fact, he admitted hesitating 
       in carrying out his plan once he was requested by the 
       Cali Cartel to make three test runs because he knew it 
       was wrong. (Tr. at 1201.) Further, he did not tell 
       agents Bowers and Mohle the full extent of his plan 
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       until after he was arrested. (Tr. at 1181.) Additionally, 
       there was testimony from the agents that they never 
       authorized Defendant to distribute cocaine and that 
       Defendant had been told in the past this could not be 
       done. . . . 
 
(Supplemental Appendix ("S.A.") at 21). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. THE DEFENSE OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 
 
Defendants Pitt and Strube contend that prejudicial error 
resulted from the district court's refusal to give a jury 
instruction based on their defense of public authority. 
Defendants filed a Notice of Intent to Present the Defense of 
Public Authority pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.3 and 
requested that the district court issue a jury instruction for 
that defense. The district court declined reasoning that, 
since Pitt did not have actual authority to empower Strube 
to move cocaine, Strube was not entitled to an instruction 
on that defense. Instead, the district court instructed the 
jury on entrapment by estoppel for Pitt and mistake of fact 
for Strube.1 
 
The district court's refusal to give a requested jury 
instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United 
States v. Gross, 961 F.2d 1097, 1101 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
506 U.S. 965 (1992). In determining whether the district 
court abused its discretion, this Court evaluates whether 
the proffered instruction was legally correct, whether or not 
it was substantially covered by other instructions, and 
whether its omission prejudiced the defendant. Id. However, 
inasmuch as we review a "court's refusal to instruct the 
jury on a defense theory de novo," United States v. Stewart, 
___ F.3d ___, 1999 WL 499881, at *10 (3d Cir. July 16, 
1999), it would have been an abuse of discretion if the 
defendants were entitled to a public authority charge and 
the court refused to give it. 
 
The defense of "public authority" is based in common 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Mistake of fact is not a complete defense, but can negate the intent 
element necessary for a conviction. 
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law. Under the defense, illegal actions committed by a 
public official or an officer of the law in the course of his 
duties were not crimes.2 Originally, this defense only 
applied to cases where the agency possessed the authority 
to permit the actor to engage in the otherwise illegal 
conduct and the actor was given permission. Published 
decisions pertaining to the defense of actual public 
authority are sparse, possibly because reliance on the 
defense is rare. 
 
Recognition of the defense of "apparent" public authority 
appears in United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 
1976), a case related to the infamous Watergate debacle. A 
divided court of the D.C. Circuit decided that the defense 
should be extended to an individual who acted at the 
behest of a government official and in reasonable reliance 
on that official's authority to permit the behavior. Id. at 
948-49. Judge Wilkey, writing for the majority, cited two 
requirements a defendant must show to excuse his 
conduct: 1) there were facts justifying defendant's 
reasonable reliance on the official; and 2) there is a legal 
theory on which to base a reasonable belief that the official 
possessed the authority to permit the conduct. Id. at 949. 
This has become known as the defense of "apparent public 
authority." This defense differs from actual public authority 
because the defendant is not required to establish that the 
government official had the authority to sanction the illegal 
activity. Instead, the defendant asserts the belief that his 
action was condoned by the agency which he believed had 
authorized him to engage in the criminal conduct. 
 
After Barker, the number of cases where the defendant 
claimed that he was acting under actual or apparent public 
authority began to increase.3 As a consequence, Congress 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Often the cases involved police officers and their conduct in the 
course 
of their duties. 
 
3. Many times, defendants claimed they were acting on the authority of 
the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"). See, United States v. Anderson, 
872 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1004 (1989); United 
States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir.), modified on other 
grounds, 801 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 
(1987); United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1985); United 
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became concerned with the increasing number of 
defendants attempting to utilize this common law defense, 
the problems of surprise the defense created at trial and 
the subsequent disclosures of confidential information 
which the defense often required.4 Therefore, Congress 
proposed an addition to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requiring a defendant to make a pre-trial 
disclosure of his intention to use the defense. The proposed 
rule was added to the "Omnibus Intelligence and Security 
Improvements Act" (H.R. 1082, 1985) and was entitled 
"Title II --Intelligence or Law Enforcement Defense Pretrial 
Notification Act." 
 
When the Omnibus Intelligence and Security 
Improvements Act was not enacted into law, the Justice 
Department submitted the proposed rule to the Criminal 
Rules Advisory Committee. The Committee prepared and 
circulated a proposed rule in September of 1986 requesting 
comment, proposed alterations, and possible concerns. 
Before the proposed rule emerged from the rule-making 
process, it was adopted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-690, S 6483, 104 Stat. 4181). 
 
Since Congress short-circuited the rule-making process 
in adding a Rule 12.3 to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, no Advisory Committee Note ("Note") 
accompanies the rule; however, a proposed Note was 
submitted in connection with the Criminal Rules Advisory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1099 
(1984); United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 839 (1986); United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 
1983); United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980). As a 
result, the defense of actual or apparent public authority was often 
termed the "CIA Defense." 
 
4. In fact, many of the pre-Rule 12.3 public authority cases involve 
defendants/appellants claiming error in both the denial of public 
authority jury instructions and in excluding evidence supporting their 
public authority defense under the Classified Information and 
Procedures Act ("CIPA"). CIPA was enacted to reduce the amount of 
classified information divulged by requiring pre-trial hearings to 
determine the relevance of the evidence. 
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Committee September 1986 proposal.5 Courts have 
subsequently looked to that proposed but unadopted Note 
for guidance as to the scope and application of Rule 12.3. 
 
That Note cites two cases as examples of what the Rule 
was intended to cover, United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 
621 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 
967 (4th Cir. 1983). In Sampol, defendants convicted of 
murder for their role in an assassination appealed the 
court's refusal to allow their affirmative defense that the 
CIA authorized the killing. In Wilson, a former intelligence 
agent was convicted of selling weapons to Libya. On appeal, 
Wilson claimed he had acted on the good faith belief that 
his actions were sanctioned by the CIA. The court refused 
to overturn Wilson's conviction because he had been 
permitted to introduce evidence of an undercover defense 
and the jury had rejected it.6 
 
Once Rule 12.3 was enacted, the public authority defense 
required two components: 1) a procedural component, 
namely, compliance with the Rule; and 2) a substantive 
common law component. Rule 12.3 itself is entirely 
procedural in nature. It is similar to Rules 12.1 and 12.2 
which require defendants to give notice for defenses of alibi 
and insanity. Rule 12.3(a)(1) requires that the defendant 
file, at the time of pre-trial motions, a notice of intent to 
use the defense of actual or believed public authority. Rule 
12.3(a)(2) also includes disclosure requirements pertaining 
to witnesses and other evidence. Rule 12.3 does not, 
however, include a discussion of substantive requirements 
for the defense. Therefore, the Rule does not alter the 
common law requirements. 
 
The language of Rule 12.3 enumerates two defenses: 1) 
actual public authority; and 2) believed or apparent public 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Proposal is reprinted at 111 F.R.D. 489, 499. 
 
6. Wilson was unsuccessful in raising this defense in two subsequent 
trials as well. United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(determining that refusal to permit "CIA Defense" and good faith defense 
for his selling of plastic explosives to Libya was not error); United 
States 
v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that refusal to allow "CIA 
Defense" for charges of attempted murder and witness tampering was 
not error). 
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authority. As already discussed, actual public authority 
involves a defendant who was authorized to commit the 
otherwise illegal act, whereas apparent public authority 
occurs when the defendant was not actually permitted to 
engage in the criminal activity but believed he was. Just as 
for actual public authority, the enactment of Rule 12.3 did 
not alter the defense of apparent public authority. 7 
Therefore, jurisdictions where actual authority was required 
were not altered. 
 
This Court approves and will follow the holding in United 
States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1994), 
which limits the use of the defense of public authority to 
those situations where the government agent in fact had 
the authority to empower the defendant to perform the acts 
in question. As a corollary, Baptista-Rodriguez holds that 
where the government agent had no such power, the 
defendant may not rest on the "public authority" defense. 
 
In this case, the unrebutted testimony was that neither 
Bowers nor Mohle had the authority to empower Pitt to 
engage in acts alleged and proven with respect to the 
charged conspiracy. To the contrary, the testimony was to 
the effect that only the Director of Customs and the 
Director of the Drug Enforcement Agency, in conjunction 
with the approval of the United States Attorney for the 
subject district, could sanction and authorize the type of 
conduct in which Pitt and Strube engaged with respect to 
the charged 468 kilograms of cocaine. 
 
The district court did charge the jury, as to Pitt only, with 
respect to the defense of entrapment by estoppel. This 
defense arises when a government official tells a defendant 
that certain conduct is legal and the defendant commits 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. United States v. Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995), aff'd 
sub nom United States v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir.), reh'g 
denied, 149 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 1998) (determining that authority relied 
upon must be real and not apparent), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 
S.Ct. 2365 (1999); United States v. Rosenthal , 793 F.2d 1214, 1235-37 
(11th Cir. 1986) (stating that defendant could only be exonerated if he 
relied on real and not apparent authority); United States v. Duggan, 743 
F.2d 59, 83-84 (2d Cir. 1984) (declining to adopt apparent authority 
from Barker and instead requiring actual authority). 
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what otherwise would be a crime in reasonable reliance on 
the official representation. See Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 
at 1368 n.18 for a comparative analysis of the defenses of 
innocent intent, public authority, apparent public authority 
and entrapment by estoppel. 
 
In this case, while there was no testimony by Pitt that he 
was told by either Bowers or Mohle that he could engage in 
the indicted activity, Pitt did offer testimony to the effect 
that he believed he had the implicit authority to engage in 
whatever criminal activity was necessary in order to entice 
the Carli Cartel to eventually use his ship to transport the 
large quantity of cocaine to the United States for seizure 
and thereby bring about the arrest of persons who would 
arrive to take control of the shipment or parts of the 
shipment.8 
 
We find no error in the decision of the district court in 
refusing to give the public authority defense instruction 
and we find that the entrapment by estoppel instruction 
was the proper instruction as to Pitt. However, Strube, who 
had no contact with Bowers or Mohle prior to his 
involvement with the shipments of the cocaine from Los 
Angeles to New York was not entitled to a similar 
instruction. The assurances of Pitt, his partner in crime, do 
not rise to the level of instructions, encouragement, or 
advice from a government official. 
 
B. DENIAL OF PITT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL BASED 
ON THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT BY ESTOPPEL 
 
Pitt argues that it was error for the district court to deny 
his motion for acquittal because the prosecution failed to 
rebut his defense of entrapment by estoppel. Against that 
argument the Court is required to view the evidence and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The requirement of pre-trial notice as to a defense based on 
government authority, alibi, and insanity entitles the government to be 
prepared for such a defense. Curiously, we find no requirement that a 
defense based on entrapment by estoppel be the subject of similar pre- 
trial notice and accompanying requirements. However, from a conceptual 
standpoint, we see little, if any, difference between the defense of 
apparent public authority and entrapment by estoppel. Since the issue 
of notice prior to use of the entrapment by estoppel defense has not been 
briefed, we see no need to rule definitively on that issue at this time. 
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inferences logically deduced therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. United States v. Pungitore, 910 
F.2d 1084, 1128-29 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 
915 (1991). 
 
United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 
1991) teaches that the entrapment by estoppel defense 
rests not on the defendant's state of mind, but on a due 
process theory that shifts the focus from the conduct of the 
defendant to the conduct of the government. Pitt argues 
that the facts, as developed in a light most favorable to the 
government, were not sufficient to contradict his defense of 
entrapment by estoppel. He points to the fact that he was 
under contract with Customs to work as a confidential 
informant; that the Customs agents were aware that Pitt 
would work on cases without a specific contract; and that 
they knew of his plan to import approximately 16,000 kilos 
of cocaine into the United States from Colombia. 
 
Based on that combination of facts, Pitt argues that it 
could be inferred that he was authorized to engage in the 
preliminary transactions, i.e., the shipment of the 468 
kilograms of cocaine from Los Angeles to New York City, to 
gain the confidence of the Colombian cartel. Such an 
argument justified the district court's submission of the 
defense of entrapment by estoppel, but is insufficient to 
support an acquittal as a matter of law. 
 
The defense of entrapment by estoppel turns on 
credibility. The jurors apparently believed Customs Agents 
Bowers and Mohle when they testified that they did not 
know of Pitt's plan to distribute the three shipments of 
cocaine from Los Angeles to New York, nor had they 
authorized such conduct. Moreover, as indicated in the 
district court's summary cited earlier, Pitt clearly testified 
that no one authorized him directly or indirectly to commit 
the crimes for which he stands convicted. 
 
The district court properly denied Pitt's post-verdict 
motion for an acquittal. 
 
C. FAILURE TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT AGAINST 
STRUBE FOR ALLEGED OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT BY THE 
GOVERNMENT 
 
Defendant Strube argues on appeal that, due to 
outrageous conduct by the government, it was error for the 
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district court to refuse to dismiss the indictment against 
him. Strube, unlike Pitt, did not testify. On appeal, through 
counsel, he appears to concede that he engaged in the 
charged conspiracy, but argues that from its inception 
through its planning, staffing, funding, implementation and 
direction, it was a creature of Richard Pitt, who was himself 
a creature of the United States Customs Service. While 
acknowledging the fact of a dispute between Pitt and the 
Customs agents as to whether they had authorized Pitt to 
move loads of drugs across the country in aid of the plan 
to use the Ridgely Warfield ship to transport the cocaine 
from Colombia to the United States, Strube argues that it 
is not in dispute that Pitt told his recruits to move loads of 
cocaine across the country, that Pitt told them that 
Customs had specifically authorized them to do this, and 
that the recruits, including Strube, had every reason to 
believe what Pitt told them and to do as instructed. 
 
Strube advances the proposition that the government 
action by Bowers and Mohle in overseeing the Pitt operation 
with the goal of eventual use of the Ridgely Warfield to 
make a huge drug bust aimed at discouraging the 
continued importation of cocaine by a Colombian cartel, 
should require under due process principles a dismissal of 
his prosecution. To achieve that desired result, Strube 
alleges that the conduct of Bowers and Mohle in their 
oversight of Pitt constituted "outrageous government 
conduct." 
 
The government argues that Strube failed to raise this 
defense at trial and, therefore, it should be considered 
waived and Strube should be precluded from raising the 
issue on appeal. 
 
The defense of outrageous government conduct examines 
whether a defendant's due process rights have been 
violated because the government created the crime for the 
sole purpose of obtaining a conviction. It emerged from 
dicta in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), 
where the Court determined that the entrapment defense 
was not available to the defendant because he was 
predisposed to committing the crime, but went on to state 
that some day there may be a due process defense based 
upon outrageous government conduct. Id. at 431. Then, in 
 
                                12 
  
United States v. Hampton, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), the Court 
upheld Hampton's conviction, thereby limiting the defense.9 
Although the conviction was upheld by a majority of five, 
the concurrence of Justices Powell and Blackmun 
demonstrated their hesitancy to foreclose the existence of a 
due process challenge. 
 
United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980) 
teaches that the defense of outrageous government conduct 
is based on an alleged defect in the institution of the 
prosecution itself and, as a consequence, is covered by the 
provisions of Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b) which requires that a 
defendant raise in a pretrial motion: (1) defenses and 
objections based on defects in the institution of the 
prosecution; or (2) defenses and objections based on defects 
in the indictment or information. Since Nunez-Rios did not 
raise the issue of outrageous government conduct prior to 
trial, the court held he had waived the right to assert the 
defense on appeal. Id. at 1099. It is well established that 
the issue of outrageous government conduct is for the 
court, and not the jury, to resolve. Id. at 1098. See also 
United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 234 (3d Cir. 
1998). As a consequence, the necessity for the pretrial 
motion to dismiss is obvious unless the evidence 
supporting the claim of outrageous government conduct is 
not known to the defendant prior to trial. 
 
This Circuit addressed failure to plead the defense in 
United States v. Gonzales, 927 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1991). In 
that case, a drug transaction was initiated by an informant. 
A government agent was the seller and the defendant was 
a buyer. After his conviction, defendant argued that the 
contingency fee arrangement between the informant and 
the government constituted outrageous governmental 
conduct. The Court examined the procedural requirement 
outlined in Nunez-Rios, supra, but declined to apply a 
procedural bar under the facts of that case because defense 
counsel did not receive relevant information until the eve of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In Hampton, a government informant supplied the defendant with the 
heroin he sold to an undercover government agent. The defendant stated 
that the government's conduct of being both the supplier and buyer 
violated his due process rights. 
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trial, making compliance with the procedural requirement 
virtually impossible. The Court then evaluated the case 
based upon a plain error standard and determined that the 
conduct was not outrageous.10 
 
Strube did not raise the defense of outrageous 
government conduct in a pretrial motion, and he has 
provided no good explanation for failing to do so. Unlike the 
defendant in Gonzales, Strube did not discover facts about 
government involvement shortly before his trial. Rather, 
Strube's main defense at trial was that he was authorized 
by a government agent to commit his illegal actions. 
Therefore, Strube was always aware of the facts upon which 
he now claims this defense. Since Strube offers no reason 
for his failure to raise the defense at trial, the Court need 
not make an exception to his waiver. See, United States v. 
Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 773 (10th Cir. 1975) (refusing to 
grant an exception to waiver on appeal because the 
defendant had two years to raise the defense, he failed to 
demonstrate good cause for non-compliance with Rule 
12(b), and he failed to show any prejudice from the waiver). 
 
Even if Strube had properly raised this defense, it would 
fail. Strube claims his case parallels United States v. Twigg, 
588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), because the government 
"created, staffed, directed and implemented a criminal 
enterprise which would not have otherwise existed." 
(Strube's Op. Br. at 36). In Twigg, the Court addressed 
charges of drug production where the government provided 
chemical components, glassware, expertise and a location. 
Without that assistance, the defendants would not have 
had the ability to produce the drug.11  Strube argues that, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The informant in Gonzales had a contingency fee arrangement with 
the government that was not fully disclosed until the Friday before a 
Monday trial. The informant and the government had set up a "reverse 
sting" and the defendant was convicted of drug charges. 
 
11. Strube fails to recognize that, since Twigg, this Court has used 
extreme caution in finding due process violations in undercover settings. 
United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1065 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 
U.S. 1047 (1996). See also, United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 
229-30 (3d Cir. 1998) (continuing to recognize the existence of the 
defense but observing the hesitancy of the judiciary to uphold due 
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as in Twigg, the government created the crime through its 
agents, Pitt, Bowers and Mohle. 
 
Assuming, arguendo, that Pitt was an agent of Customs 
acting with its authority, Strube's defense would still fail. 
There are significant factual differences between the cases 
Strube cites and his case. In previous cases, courts have 
determined that, in order for the claim of outrageous 
government conduct to succeed, a government agent has to 
initiate the criminal conduct with the goal of obtaining a 
conviction and must draw the defendant into the illegal 
activity to bring about that goal. See, United States v. West, 
511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (reversing conviction because 
agent contacted defendant, who had no criminal record, 
and supplied him with drugs defendant sold to another 
agent);12 Twigg, supra (reversing conviction because 
informant contacted defendants and initiated drug 
production to get them convicted); Nolan-Cooper, supra 
(emphasizing defendant's ongoing involvement in criminal 
activity before agent approached her); United States v. 
Gardner, 658 F. Supp. 1573 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (reversing 
conviction because informant pursued defendant even after 
defendant refused to find cocaine for him and tried to give 
informant's money back).13 In this case, various Colombian 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
process violation claims); United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 945 
n.6 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986) (same). See also, United 
States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 
(1982); United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1983); United 
States v. DeRewal, 10 F.3d 100 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 
1033 (1994) (all calling Twigg into doubt). 
 
12. Called into doubt by United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11,12 (3d Cir. 
1983). 
 
13. See also, Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(reversing bootleggers' convictions because they had ceased criminal 
activity until an agent contacted them and provided supplies for 
production); United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. 
Cal. 1981) (reversing conviction because informant induced defendants 
into cocaine deal so his DEA friends could arrest them; defendants 
lacked prior criminal involvement and wanted to back out); United States 
v. Mosely, 965 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1992) (upholding conviction even 
though seller was a government agent); United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 
1515 (10th Cir.) (upholding the conviction because defendants originally 
contacted the undercover agent rather than being induced into criminal 
activity), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 941 (1994). 
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drug cartels were the target for criminal prosecution. So 
while this operation was intended to secure a conviction, it 
was not the conviction of Strube. The defense of outrageous 
government conduct is not applicable. 
 
Even if the operation had been orchestrated to convict 
Strube, the conduct would still not rise to the level of 
violating Strube's right to due process. To meet that 
standard, the challenged conduct must be shocking, 
outrageous, and clearly intolerable. Mosely, 965 F.2d at 
910. It must violate our sense of fundamental fairness or 
shock the universal sense of justice. Russell, 411 U.S. at 
432. There is nothing so shocking here. 
 
In sum, Strube waived the issue of outrageous 
government conduct by failing to move to dismiss prior to 
trial. In any event, the claim of outrageous government 
conduct is totally lacking in merit. 
 
D. THE POST-CONVICTION CHALLENGE TO THE LACK 
OF VENUE 
 
Both Pitt and Strube argue that the government failed to 
meet its burden of proving the venue of the alleged offenses. 
Neither defendant challenged the absence of venue until 
after their convictions. The government asserts that the 
proof established venue. We need not address the issue of 
venue in this case given the time of the initial objection. 
United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824, 829 (3d Cir. 1999)14 
is dispositive in its holding that the issue of improper 
venue, at the very latest, must be raised in every possible 
scenario before the jury reaches its verdict. 
 
E. ADMISSION OF TAPE RECORDINGS BY STRUBE 
ALLEGEDLY RELATED TO SUBSEQUENT UNCHARGED 
NARCOTICS TRANSACTIONS 
 
Over objection, the district court permitted the 
government to introduce the May 22, 1995 recorded 
conversation between Strube and George Morales, a 
government informant. The conversation was nine months 
after the intercepted third shipment of cocaine. 15 It is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. A petition for certiorari was filed on June 4, 1999 (No. 98-9669). 
 
15. A transcript of the audio tape is found in the Supplemental 
Appendix. (S.A. at 12-18). 
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apparent from a reading of the conversation that the jury 
could find that Strube is discussing cocaine and, by 
inference, his involvement in the first shipment of 150 
kilograms of cocaine. The district court found the statement 
admissible against the background of the defense anchored 
in public authority. To the extent the statements of Strube 
alluded to subsequent cocaine transactions, they were 
admissible under the teachings of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) on 
the issue of intention. We find no error. 
 
F. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY TO 
LAUNDER DRUG TRAFFICKING PROCEEDS 
 
United States v. Reed, 77 F.3d 139, 142 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 517 U.S. 1246 (1996), teaches that mere 
transportation of drug proceeds is insufficient proof of a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 1956 (a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(2) for 
laundering drug trafficking proceeds. However, the evidence 
viewed in a light most favorable to the government 
demonstrates that in excess of $1 million in drug trafficking 
proceeds was collected in New York and transported, either 
to Colombia, South America or to Pennsylvania. The 
proceeds were used by both Pitt and Strube to pay 
individuals like Wallace Pitt and others for their assistance 
in flying and driving the cocaine across the country. The 
monies were also used to pay the credit card bills of Pitt 
which included travel charges related to his drug trafficking 
activities. We find the claim of insufficient evidence as to 
the laundering of the drug trafficking proceeds to be 
without merit. 
 
G. DENIAL OF STRUBE'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL 
 
At closing argument, in response to a defense claim that 
the government had strong-armed its witness, Wallace Pitt, 
into a guilty plea, the government countered with the 
following statement: 
 
       I will be brief. There has been a lot of speculation as to 
       why some people are here and some aren't. I could 
       spend a whole lot of time explaining to you all of that, 
       but it's not important. Because what the Judge is going 
       to instruct you is you have to consider whether these 
       men did these acts, not why or what happened to 
       everybody else. 
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       But you do know some of that. I think it has been 
       slightly misportrayed to you. Wally Pitt wasn't beaten 
       into submission. Wally Pitt is a man. He admitted that 
       he did something wrong. He realized after the fact that 
       when you take 150 kilos across the country even 
       though your brother lied to you -- [Defense objection]. 
 
(J.A. at 1357). 
 
Strube's counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis that 
this statement by the government constituted an 
impermissible reference to the fact that Strube had not 
testified. 
 
We find no error in the denial of the motion. Wefind the 
statement to come within the "invited reply" doctrine 
enunciated in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11 
(1985). In any event, the district court gave a curative 
instruction.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. The district court's jury charge included the following instruction: 
 
        If you find that any government witness was an accomplice to the 
       commission of the crimes involved in this indictment, you should 
       consider such testimony with greater caution than that of a witness 
       who is not an accomplice. 
 
        You should also consider the extent to which such testimony may 
       have been influenced by the hope or expectation of favorable 
       treatment from law enforcement authorities. 
 
        Now you have heard testimony from government witnesses who 
       have pled guilty to charges arising out of the same facts in this 
case. 
       You are instructed that you are to draw no conclusions or inference 
       of any kind about the guilt of these defendants on trial from the 
fact 
       that a prosecution witness pled guilty to similar charges. 
 
        That witness's decision to plead guilty was a personal decision 
       about his own guilt. It may not be used by you in any way as 
       evidence against or unfavorable to the defendants on trial here. 
 
        By that very fact, ladies and gentlemen, you may not draw any 
       adverse inference to any defendant in this case who has not 
       testified. 
 
        Mr. Strube did not testify in this case. A defendant in a criminal 
       case has the absolute right under our constitution not to testify. 
The 
       fact that defendant Strube did not testify must not be discussed or 
       considered by you in any way when deliberating or in arriving at 
       your verdict. No inference of any kind may be drawn from the fact 
       that Mr. Strube decided to exercise his privilege under the 
       constitution not to testify. 
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H. THE TWO-LEVEL ENHANCEMENT OF STRUBE'S 
OFFENSE LEVEL FOR POSSESSION OF A FIREARM 
 
The district court found the total offense level for Strube 
to be 41 with a criminal history of III providing for a 
sentencing range of 360 months to life. Strube received a 
sentence of 360 months in contrast to the life sentence 
imposed on Pitt. The total offense level included a two level 
enhancement for the .357 caliber revolver displayed to 
Wallace Pitt. 
 
The district court addressed the issue of weapon 
enhancement at the sentencing hearing as follows: 
 
       Good morning. The Court will address the objections 
       that have been filed. The first objection was to the 
       enhancement for firearms possessions. 
 
       I am fully aware of the defendant's argument. As I 
       review the evidence, there was a delivery of cocaine at 
       the residence of the defendant, and that Wallace Pitt 
       was present at Mr. Strube's residence and was escorted 
       through the house and shown the firearms. 
 
       As I recall, was not Wallace Pitt a collector himself? 
 
       [By counsel]: I believe that he had a firearms license, 
       yes, Your Honor. 
 
       [The Court]: But in any event, he recalled only a few of 
       those being antique items or collector items and that 
       the balance were operable weapons. And I believe that 
       under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that those facts 
       support an enhancement. 
 
(J.A. at 1520). 
 
The district judge permitted counsel to make their 
respective arguments regarding the objection to thefirearm 
enhancement and then concluded: 
 
       . . . With regard to the objections, I believe that there 
       is sufficient argument made by the defendants as to 
       the role in the offense and will delete that two point 
       enhancement. 
 
       In all other respects, the Court adopts the factual 
       findings and the guideline application as set forth in 
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       the first and second addendum to the presentence 
       report in support of the enhancements. 
 
(J.A. at 1543). The Presentence Report, describing the 
offense conduct, stated that Wallace Pitt, half-brother of 
Strube's co-defendant, Richard Pitt, drove a quantity of 
cocaine from Utah to Strube's home in Pennsylvania, where 
he met up with Richard Pitt, who had flown another 
quantity of cocaine from Utah to Pennsylvania. The report 
continues: 
 
       Wallace Pitt told investigators that Mr. Strube took the 
       bags of cocaine from his car and later took him on a 
       tour of his house. Wallace Pitt said the defendant 
       [Strube] showed him several firearms including a .357 
       caliber revolver. While at the defendant's house, 
       Richard Pitt paid Wallace Pitt $5,000. 
 
"We review the district court's factual findings in relation 
to sentencing issues for clear error." United States v. Felton, 
55 F.3d 861, 864 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. 
Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 447 (3d Cir. 1994)); United States v. 
Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 964 (3d Cir. 1992))."Our review 
with respect to the court's application and interpretation of 
the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary." Felton, 55 F.3d at 
864 (citing cases). 
 
Application note 3 to USSG S2D1.1 states that 
 
       . . . The enhancement for weapon possession reflects 
       the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers 
       possess weapons. The adjustment should be applied if 
       the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable 
       that the weapon was connected with the offense. . . . 
 
In United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 734 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 514 U.S. 1023 (1995), this Court noted that "it was 
the risk of violence caused by the combination offirearms 
and drugs that merited an increase in sentence." 
 
Although the district court here made no actualfindings 
on the record, the court's statements quoted above 
implicitly recognize that the weapons shown to Wallace Pitt 
were "connected with the offense" and were certainly 
intended to indicate a potential for violence. It takes no 
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imagination whatsoever to conclude that Strube displayed 
his weapons to Pitt, not so Pitt, the gun collector, could 
admire them, but so Pitt, the drug courier, would clearly 
understand that Strube was never to be crossed. As this 
Court has concluded: "[the defendant's] `arsenal' created a 
strong inference that he possessed these weapons in order 
to further the drug transaction." United States v. Demes, 
941 F.2d 220, 223 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 949 
(1991). 
 
We find no error in the enhancement for possession of a 
weapon. 
 
I. THE SUA SPONTE MOLDING OF THE JURY'S SPECIAL 
FORFEITURE VERDICT 
 
Count V of the Indictment sought the forfeiture of 
property owned by Strube in Columbia, Pennsylvania and 
also $1,081,400.00 in U.S. currency, pursuant to 
provisions of 21 U.S.C. S 853(a) and 18 U.S.C.S 982(a)(1). 
 
The jury returned a special verdict forfeiting $826,400.00 
in U.S. currency from Pitt and an additional $255,000.00 in 
currency from Strube along with the Strube residence. 
Thereafter, the district court entered a judgment with joint 
and several liability against both Pitt and Strube for the 
total forfeited sum of $1,081,400.00. Strube challenges the 
molding of the verdict as contrary to his right to have the 
jury determine the issue and amount of forfeiture. The 
government, building on the conviction of both Pitt and 
Strube on Count IV, the money laundering count, 
interprets the jury findings of the two sums of $826,400 
and $255,000 as its determination that the entire sum the 
government sought to forfeit, $1,081,400, was involved in 
the money laundering offense and was therefore forfeitable 
under a joint responsibility analysis. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(e) provides that a special verdict shall 
be returned by the jury as to the extent of the interest or 
property subject to forfeiture where the indictment alleges 
such interest or property are subject to criminal forfeiture. 
Strube contends that the district court erred in molding the 
verdict to impose a forfeiture upon him in the sum of 
$1,081,400 rather than the sum of $255,000 set forth in 
the jury's verdict. 
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Congress has provided that, in imposing sentence on a 
person convicted of, among other things, an offense in 
violation of the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C.S 1956, 
a court "shall order that the person forfeit to the United 
States any property . . . involved in such offense." 18 U.S.C. 
S 982(a)(1). Pitt and Strube were both convicted as co- 
conspirators under S 1956(h) (Count IV of the indictment). 
We interpret S 982(a)(1) as imposing a rule of joint and 
several liability in the case of a money laundering 
conspiracy. The statute does not say that each conspirator 
shall forfeit only such property involved in the offense 
which is or has ever been in that conspirator's possession. 
Rather, the statute recognizes that the amount of property 
involved in a money laundering conspiracy cannot be 
different for different conspirators. 
 
In view of the above discussion, there is no need to reach 
21 U.S.C. S 853(a)(1); however, it leads to the same 
conclusion with respect to forfeiture of property involved in 
drug-related crimes. Section 853(a)(1) provides for the 
forfeiture of "any property constituting, or derived from, any 
proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a 
result of [a qualifying drug offense]." 17 In imposing sentence 
on such person, the court "shall order[ ] . . . that the person 
forfeit to the United States all property described in this 
subsection." 21 U.S.C. S 853(a)(1) (emphasis added). Like 
18 U.S.C. S 982(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. S 853(a)(1) imposes joint 
and several liability with respect to forfeiture. See United 
States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027, 1043 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(concluding that S 853(a)(1) "is not limited to property that 
the defendant acquired individually but includes all 
property that the defendant derived indirectly from those 
who acted in concert with him in furthering the criminal 
enterprise"), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1281 (1997).18 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Included among such offenses are those set forth in 21 U.S.C. SS 841 
and 846. Section 841(a)(1) makes it unlawful for any person to 
knowingly or intentionally distribute a controlled substance. Section 846 
makes it unlawful for a person to conspire to distribute a controlled 
substance. Pitt and Strube were both convicted of such offenses. 
 
18. McHan also points to cases involving the RICO forfeiture statute, 
where "courts have unanimously concluded that conspirators are jointly 
and severally liable for amounts received pursuant to their illicit 
agreement." McHan, 101 F.3d at 1043 (citing cases). 
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Thus, whether under 18 U.S.C. S 982(a)(1) or 21 U.S.C. 
S 853(a)(1), Pitt and Strube were liable in forfeiture for the 
full amount of cash received by the conspiracy. The jury's 
special verdicts can be harmonized by interpreting them to 
refer to the amount that each defendant personally 
received. It was, therefore, proper for the trial judge to 
harmonize the verdicts in this manner, to apply the strict 
rule of joint and several liability that governs under both 
forfeiture statutes, and to enter an appropriate judgment 
based on this understanding. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the convictions and 
sentences of both appellants, Richard L. Pitt and William 
Michael Strube, are AFFIRMED.19 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. We reject without discussion the claim that the district court erred 
in refusing the requests of the defendants to play, in their entirety, 25 
taped conversations between Pitt and the Customs Agents Bowers and 
Mohle, and the claim that the government failed to comply with both the 
Jencks Act and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), finding both 
claims to be without merit. 
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